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Abstract In prediction-motion (PM) tasks, people judge the
current position of an occluded moving object. People can
also judge the current number on an occluded digital counter
or the current colour of an occluded colour-change display.
These abilities imply that we can run mental simulations at a
chosen speed, even without feedback from the senses. There is
increasing evidence that the brain has a common rate control
module for pacing all such dynamic mental simulations. The
common rate control account of PM has more explanatory
power than alternative accounts which emphasise the role of
mental imagery or the oculomotor system. Finally, neuroim-
aging work suggests that the common rate controller is a part
of a core timing network that incorporates basal ganglia
circuitry.
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In a dynamic environment, moving objects often become oc-
cluded behind other things. It is conventional to cite ‘ball
games’ and ‘driving’ as real-world scenarios where occluded
motion matters, and experiments have often used videos of
moving vehicles (Hancock & Manser, 1997; Horswill,
Helman, Ardiles, & Wann, 2005; Schiff & Oldak, 1990).
However, we often need to engage with occluded motion,
even when not driving or playing sports. After all, temporary
occlusions often result from blinks or visually disruptive
changes in viewpoint.
In the lab, occluded motion processing has been studied
with prediction-motion (PM) tasks (see Fig. 1). PM tasks have
a long history (Gottsdanker, 1956; Slater-Hammel, 1955;
Wiener, 1962) and have sometimes been calledmotion extrap-
olation or time-to-contact tasks (with terminology partly
reflecting the author’s theoretical assumptions). Modern PM
experiments typically require the participant to press a button
when the occluded moving target arrives at a goal (Battaglini,
Campana, & Casco, 2013; Baurès, Oberfeld, & Hecht, 2010,
2011; Benguigui, Broderick, & Ripoll, 2004; DeLucia,
Tresilian, & Meyer, 2000; Makin, Poliakoff, Chen, &
Stewart, 2008; Makin, Stewart, & Poliakoff, 2009; Peterken,
Brown, & Bowman, 1991; Rosenbaum, 1975; Sokolov &
Pavlova, 2003). This type of PM task is sometimes called a
‘production task’ because participants produce a motor re-
sponse (see Fig. 1a). Another variant requires the participant
to judge whether the target reappeared from occlusion too
early or too late (Bennett & Benguigui, 2013; DeLucia &
Liddell, 1998; Jonikaitis, Deubel, & de’Sperati, 2009; Lyon
& Waag, 1995; O’Reilly, Mesulam, & Nobre, 2008). This is
sometimes called an ‘interruption paradigm’ (see Fig. 1b) be-
cause the target trajectory is interrupted. Production tasks and
interruption paradigms are both types of PM task.
The first eye-tracking study with occluded moving targets
was published 87 years ago (Travis & Dodge, 1930), and eye
tracking across occlusion has now been examined in detail
(e.g. Becker & Fuchs, 1985; Bennett & Barnes, 2003;
Churchland, Chou, & Lisberger, 2003; Makin & Poliakoff,
2011; Pola & Wyatt, 1997). Meanwhile, developmental psy-
chologists have used eye tracking to investigate the emergence
of PM abilities in infants (von Hofsten, Kochukhova, &
Rosander, 2007).
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Another common experiment requires the participant to
respond when an occluded approaching object would hit them
(see Fig. 1c). This has a slightly different history and is more
often called ‘time-to-contact estimation’, or ‘arrival-time esti-
mation’ (Hecht & Savelsburgh, 2004; Lee, 1976; Lugtigheid
& Welchman, 2011; Schiff & Detwiler, 1979).
PM tasks in other feature spaces have been also considered,
such as number space or colour space (Makin & Bertamini,
2014; Makin & Chauhan, 2014). Schematics of these multi-
dimensional PM experiments are shown in Fig. 2.
Bosco et al. (2015) recently published an excellent review
of PM work. They plausibly conclude that the brain can con-
tinuously update a dynamic representation of occluded mov-
ing targets, incorporating both higher-order information about
target kinematics (e.g. acceleration) and typical object-motion
characteristics stored in long-term memory (e.g. the predict-
able effects of gravity). I aim to build on this foundation by
considering both PM tasks in physical space (see Fig. 2a) and
feature space (Fig. 2b–d).
Why should psychologists be interested in PM?
Performance deficits could provide clues about the nature of
schizophrenia (Hooker & Park, 2000; Nagel et al., 2007) or
Parkinson’s disease (Schnider, Gutbrod, & Hess, 1995), or
help detect mild traumatic brain injury (Diwakar et al.,
2015). However, most PM research has been basic rather than
applied. The appeal of PM tasks is that they beautifully cap-
ture the distinction between behaviour driven by sensory in-
puts (bottom up) and behaviour driven by internal
mechanisms (top down). The brain must run on its own during
occlusion, without feedback from the senses.
Some researchers have used PM as a way of tapping the
cognitive processes they seek to understand. PM can indeed
be a useful probe; however, there is a risk of making
underanalysed assumptions about the cognitive systems re-
cruited during PM tasks. Supplementary Materials 1
Section 1 reviews three PM papers to illustrate the risk
(Gilden, Blake, & Hurst, 1995; Roth, Synofzik, & Lindner,
2013; Vagnoni, Lourenco, & Longo, 2012).
Hopefully, the current synthesis will allow future re-
searchers to acquaint themselves with the range of possible
mechanisms thatmightmediate PM. I have reviewed as much
PM literature as possible, but, most importantly, I also intro-
duce the new common rate control model.
Using the supplementary materials
To make the review more digestible, I have shifted a lot of
detail to four Supplementary Materials sections. These are
NOT essential reading. Supplementary Materials 1 provides
extra commentary and literature review. Supplementary
Materials 2 explains PM performance metrics and analysis.
Supplementary Materials 3 and 4 are the detailed methods
and results sections of Experiments 1 and 2. Code and data
from the experiments can be found on Open Science
Framework (osf.io/g4zm7).
Occluder
Press when the hidden target hits end of occluder
Reappearance too early or too late?
A) Production task
B) Interruption paradigm
C) Arrival time estimation with approach motion
Press when the hidden object would hit you!
Approaching object disappears
Moving target
Occluder
CTE Error
VE
CTE
N
  T
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D) Production task metrics
CTE = Completion Time Estimate
VE = Variable Error
Fig. 1 Different kinds of prediction-motion (PM) task (a–c). d
Production task terminology. Completion time estimate (CTE) is the
time from occlusion onset to button press. Error is CTE − perfect CTE.
Variable error (VE) is the standard deviation of CTEs across repeated
trials in a condition. (Colour figure online)
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A common rate controller or many separate rate
controllers?
An object’s position is only one variable that can visibly
change over time. We are also sensitive to feature motion,
such as change in number space or colour space (Blaser,
Pylyshyn, & Holcombe, 2000; Blaser & Sperling, 2008;
Sheth, Nijhawan, & Shimojo, 2000).
Makin and Bertamini (2014) and Makin and Chauhan
(2014) compared performance in different kinds of production
task, including a standard position task (see Fig. 2a), and novel
production tasks with occluded motion through feature space
(see Fig. 2b–d). In all tasks, participants may run a dynamic
mental simulation of the occluded process. Participants would
then press the button when their mental simulationmatched an
indicated goal state. If this story is correct, PM tasks must
involve a rate control mechanism that ensures such mental
simulations are updated at the right speed (not too fast, not
too slow).
There could be a common rate controller for updating in
different dimensions (e.g. position, number, colour, accumu-
lation). This is called the common rate control (CRC) hypoth-
esis. Alternatively, there might be separate rate controllers for
updating in each dimension. This is called the separate rate
control (SRC) hypothesis. Figure 3a and 3b show cartoon
versions of the competing CRC and SRC alternatives
(Makin, 2017).
Makin and Bertamini (2014) reasoned that if two PM tasks
employ a common rate controller then performance should be
similar in both, but if they employ separate rate controllers
performance could be different. This line of reasoning hits
an immediate barrier: How similar should performance be
for CRC, and how different for SRC? It is difficult to decide
upon a principled criterion for adjudicating between the com-
peting models.
One partial solution is to focus on a metric that taps the
functioning of the rate controller. Completion time estimates
(CTEs) and variable error (VE, the standard deviation of
CTEs) are linearly related to occlusion duration (see Fig. 3c–
d). If separate rate controllers with different characteristics are
used in each task, then any task differences will grow with
occlusion duration, resulting in different slopes. However, if
the same rate controller is used in both tasks, then slopes
should be comparable (even if intercepts differ). Makin and
Bertamini (2014) and Makin and Chauhan (2014) found that
slopes were often comparable in pairs of PM tasks and thus
argued in favour of the CRC (Supplementary Materials 2
describes slope analysis in detail).
Lyon and Waag (1995) also found that performance accu-
racy declined with occlusion duration. Their data could be
A)
 
Posi!on
Blue ver!cal target moves
Blue ver!cal target appears
Occlusion onset
(Target Disappears)
Par!cipant presses when they think 
target has arrived at the end of the 
track
10.00
7.60
5.20
Central Number
Coun!ng down toward 0 in 
decrements of 0.2
Occlusion onset
(Counter disappears)
Par!cipant presses when they think 
the hidden counter has reached 0
B)
 
Number
C) Colour
Central disk appears
Colour becomes progressively 
more similar to background
Occlusion onset
(Disk goes black)
Par!cipant presses when they think 
hidden colour matches the 
background colour
Empty area appears
Matrix filling with Gabor patches
Occlusion onset
(Gabor accumula!on 
pauses)
Par!cipant presses when they think 
the matrix of gabors is completely 
full
D) Accumula!on
Fig. 2 PM tasks in different dimensions. In all examples, there is a dynamic process on the screen, which becomes occluded. Participants assume
continuation of the dynamic process and then press when they judge it to be complete. (Colour figure online)
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modelled with computer simulations that included random
variations in ‘tracker velocity’ between trials (steady tracker)
or moment-by-moment variations within a trial (unsteady
tracker). We can now extend this claim: Decline in accuracy
with occlusion duration arises from random variations in men-
tal simulation velocity, which partly arises from noise in rate
control systems (rather than just variations in tracker velocity).
So, according to the rationale of Makin and Bertamini
(2014), intertask slope similarities support the CRC model.
But is this rationale correct? What if separate PM tasks recruit
separate rate control mechanisms, but all these rate control
mechanisms had very similar properties?
It is unlikely that every conceivable PM task has a dedicat-
ed rate control module all to itself—that reading of the SRC is
a straw man. However, all sensory systems could be endowed
with ubiquitous microcircuits that do the routine job of mak-
ing predictions about subsequent inputs (Alink, Schwiedrzik,
Kohler, Singer, & Muckli, 2010). Maybe PM performance is
uniform across feature spaces because prediction is imple-
mented in a uniform way across sensory maps? Performance
on all different PM tasks could be comparable by accident
rather than by design. This is fundamentally different from
the CRC hypothesis, which proposes that a dedicated, ana-
tomically discrete rate control module must be temporarily
coupled to sensory maps during occlusion (see Fig. 3a).
Retinotopic visual areas are tiled with elementary motion
detectors (EMDs). EMDs have small receptive fields tuned to
velocity (Burr & Thompson, 2011).Watamaniuk,McKee, and
Grzywacz (1995) concluded that trajectory detection across
multiple receptive fields can be facilitated by lateral excitatory
connections. For instance, EMDs sensitive to rightward mo-
tion send excitatory signals to adjacent right-sensitive EMDs
one place to the right in the EMD array. The chain of excit-
atory signals from one EMD to the next could continue in a
straight line across occlusion. Indeed, this was demonstrated
for 100 ms occlusions by Watamaniuk and McKee (1995).
Khoei, Masson, and Perrinet (2013) reported a set of com-
puter simulations partially inspired by the trajectory network
model. Based on their results and other theoretical
considerations, Khoei et al. (2013) proposed that PM is medi-
ated by a finely structured mechanisms that can be
Bimplemented at the scale of a single cortical area^ (p. 410).
Other sensory maps might have their own finely struc-
tured mechanisms which are analogous to trajectory net-
works. Consider the number PM task in Fig. 2b. The repre-
sentation of number 10 is closely connected to the represen-
tation of 9, then 8, then 7, then 6, et cetera (Hubbard, Piazza,
Pinel, & Dehaene, 2005). After a sequence of temporally
spaced number inputs, facilitator signals could be sent from
one number node to the next, which then detects the input
more easily, and so on. After entrainment, this chain of pre-
dictive signals could run across the occlusion period by itself
(see also Supplementary Materials 1 Section 2).
To summarize, ‘rate control’ might be a built-in network
property of all sensory systems. The correlational data provid-
ed by Makin and Bertamini (2014) and Makin and Chauhan
(2014) merely showed that performance is similar across the
PM tasks in Fig. 2. This does not completely rule out the SRC.
D)C)
+10 +9 +8 +7…
Rate 
controller
+10 +9 +8 +7…
Local 
predic!ve 
circuits
B) Separate Rate Controllers (SRC)A)Common Rate Control (CRC)
Fig. 3 Cartoon depictions of the common rate control (CRC) model (a)
and the separate rate control (SRC) models (b). c CTE versus occlusion
duration in position and number PM tasks. d VE versus occlusion
duration in position and number PM tasks. Note how the slope of the
regression lines are comparable across tasks. This could be interpreted as
evidence from the CRCmodel (Makin & Chauhan, 2014). (Colour figure
online)
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Experiment 1 thus tested the CRC and SRC models in a
novel way. Experiment 1 used position and number produc-
tion tasks (like Fig. 2a–b). One group of participants were
trained to respond too early on position trials in a false feed-
back block. They then responded earlier on both position and
number trials in a subsequent probe block (where there was no
feedback). Another group of participants were trained to re-
spond too early on number trials in a false feedback block.
They then responded earlier on number and position trials in
the subsequent probe block. CTEs from the probe blocks are
shown in Fig. 4, while the method and results are described in
Supplementary Materials 3.
Experiment 1 thus suggests that position and number tasks
are not cognitively independent. Instead, feedback on the po-
sition task altered CTEs on the number task, and feedback on
the number task altered CTEs in the position task. These re-
sults are more consistent with the CRC than SRC.
However, the feedback effect observed in Experiment 1
might reflect the summation of many minor adjustments
throughout the brain. Feedback might have altered visual ve-
locity signals, recalibrated local rate control mechanisms,
recalibrated global rate control mechanisms, introduced ge-
neric response biases, and potentiated the descending motor
pathways. The feedback effect was stronger within tasks than
between tasks. This suggests feedback adjusted both specific
systems (used by just one task) and global systems (used by
both tasks). Adjustments to the common rate control module
might explain the fraction of the feedback effect that general-
ized across tasks. However, this claim is speculative, and we
cannot completely exclude a role for generic response biases
(see Supplementary materials 3 for extra analysis). Future ex-
periments could test generalization between PM and none PM
tasks to tease apart some of these explanations.
Common or separate rate controllers? Summary
and conclusions
A plausible version of the SRCmodel proposes that trajectory
networks (Watamaniuk & McKee, 1995; Watamaniuk et al.,
1995) are a built-in property in all sensory maps (Khoei et al.,
2013). Prediction and updating could be implemented in a
similar way across cortical regions. However, Experiment 1
found that feedback on just one kind of PM task (position or
number) altered performance in two kinds of PM task (posi-
tion and number). This suggests the tasks are not completely
cognitively independent.
Previous work has found a sharp change in behavioural
performance, brain signals, eye movements, and perception
after the first 100 to 200 ms of occlusion (Benguigui et al.,
2004; Bennett & Barnes, 2004; Gray & Thornton, 2001;
Makin, Poliakoff, Ackerley, & El-Deredy, 2012; Makin,
Poliakoff, & El-Deredy, 2009; Nijhawan, 1994; Sheth et al.,
2000; Tresilian, 1995). It is telling that trajectory network
studies have mostly focused on automatic extrapolation
across relatively short occlusions. It could be that the mecha-
nisms described by Watamaniuk and McKee (1995) and
Khoei et al. (2013) are really an account of very short-
duration automatic extrapolation processes. Automatic extrap-
olation might also explain perceptual phenomena like visual
inertia (Ramachandran & Anstis, 1983), the flash-lag effect
(Nijhawan, 1994; Sheth et al., 2000), and representational
momentum (Gray & Thornton, 2001). However, local net-
works may not sustain mental simulations that play out over
longer periods. Indeed, sustained simulation probably requires
volitional effort and does not happen automatically (Pola &
Wyatt, 1997). It is this later, effortful phase (after the first ~200
ms) which could be paced by a common rate control module.
No fundamental role for mental imagery
or the oculomotor system in PM
Next I aim to contrast the CRCmodel with other accounts that
emphasize mental imagery or the oculomotor system. I be-
lieve that these accounts are flawed (albeit in interesting
ways), and the common rate control model avoids these flaws.
Mental imagery
Shepard and Metzler (1971) claimed that people can mentally
rotate 3-D objects using dynamic visual imagery. Following
these ideas, many PM researchers have claimed that appropri-
ate CTEs follow a period of ‘mental imagery’ or ‘imaginary
motion’ (Gilden et al., 1995; Huber & Krist, 2004; Schnider
et al., 1995).
Huber and Krist (2004) carefully considered the role of
mental imagery and eye movements in PM. In some condi-
tions, participants observed a ball rolling toward the edge of a
horizontal roof, and then become occluded just as it fell off.
Participants pressed a button when they thought the hidden
ball would hit the ground. They sometimes spontaneously
tracked the hidden parabolic trajectory with their eyes.
However, fixation demands had no effect on performance
(unlike other studies, where fixation had small effects;
Bennett, Baurès, Hecht, & Benguigui, 2010; Makin &
Chauhan, 2014; Makin & Poliakoff, 2011; Peterken et al.,
1991). Huber and Krist (2004) thus concluded that that eye
movements are epiphenomenal, and not functionally involved
in PM. They claimed that internal mental imagery mediated
performance.
Mental imagery was also important for de’Sperati (2003),
who conceptualized eye movements as a ‘precious window’
into a private event that would otherwise be difficult to mea-
sure (see also Crespi, Robino, Silva, & de’Sperati, 2012;
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de’Sperati & Deubel, 2006; Jonikaitis et al., 2009). This work
allows for the possibility that eye movements might facilitate
or assist mental imagery, but the mental imagery is again
primary.
I believe that the putative role of mental imagery in PM
needs to be carefully evaluated. Unlike Pylyshyn (2003), I am
not opposed the concept of mental imagery per se: After all,
the CRC model claims that ‘mental representations are up-
dated during occlusion’, and this is nearly synonymous with
saying ‘dynamic mental imagery happens during occlusion’.
However, the mere occurrence of dynamic mental imagery
cannot explain PM performance. The mental imagery would
have to be updated at a deliberate speed. Any complete ac-
count of PM must include cognitive mechanisms which tune
into the rate of change before occlusion, and then control the
speed of updating during occlusion.
To give an example, Crespi et al. (2012) ran a PM task with
billiard ball trajectories and argued that nonexperts used ‘sim-
ulation in imagery’. But how does the brain update this imag-
ery? There must be a mechanism which directs the imagery,
and ensures that it plays out at the right speed. Ultimately, it is
the director mechanism, and not just imagery itself, that is
responsible for accurate performance.
The oculomotor system
Saccadic and smooth pursuit eye movements work synergis-
tically to trackmoving objects (see SupplementaryMaterials 1
Sections 3 and 4). The oculomotor system is well understood
at mechanistic and neural levels (Barnes, 2008; Lisberger,
2010).Makin and Poliakoff (2011) argued that the oculomotor
system mediates position PM: Participants could track the
visible targets with pursuit eye movements and continue to
track as well as possible across occlusion. They would press
the button when gaze reaches the end of the occluder
(DeLucia & Liddell, 1998). Even if eye movements are
inhibited, the oculomotor system might drive covert tracking
with visuospatial attention (c.f. Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola, &
Umilta, 1987). Makin and Poliakoff (2011) thus proposed that
the oculomotor system mediates PM during both fixation and
free viewing conditions.
Several models of the pursuit system include a velocity
memory component for top-down control in the absence of
visual velocity signals (Barnes, 2008; Bennett & Barnes,
2004, 2006; de Xivry, Bennett, Lefevre, & Barnes, 2006;
Lisberger, 2010). This cognitive apparatus seems well-suited
for standard position PM tasks (Makin et al., 2012; Makin
et al., 2008; Makin, Poliakoff, et al., 2009a; Makin, Stewart,
et al., 2009b).
Many studies have found that participants can track occlud-
ed targets in an approximate fashion (e.g. Bennett & Barnes,
2006), and that gaze position at the end of occlusion often
predicts judgements (Jonikaitis et al., 2009; Makin &
Poliakoff, 2011; Wexler & Klam, 2001). These correlations
could be taken as evidence for the oculomotor account (Makin
& Poliakoff, 2011). Eye tracking during occlusion certainly
indicates that the participant is cognitively engaged with the
occluded motion. However, it does not demonstrate that the
oculomotor system is essential for PM. Instead, I propose that
the brain constructs a dynamic simulation of the occluded
trajectory, and this simulation feeds both eye movements
and judgments in parallel. These output channels are
probably independent of each other.
Indeed, I now believe the oculomotor account in Makin
and Poliakoff (2011) was limited. During position PM, the
brain probably forms a continuously changing estimate of
target position, which is updated at the right speed (Bosco
et al., 2015). The eyes attempt to keep up with estimated target
position, sometimes falling behind then jumping ahead
(Bennett & Barnes, 2006; de Xivry et al., 2006). Given such
findings, we could either say (1) that the oculomotor system is
guided by a dynamic representation of target position, or (2)
that the oculomotor system includes apparatus that constructs
A) B)
Fig. 4 Completion time estimates from position and number trials on
probe blocks following feedback on just one type of task. Normal probe
blocks followed a block with unbiased feedback. Adapted probe blocks
followed a block with false feedback that trained participants to press too
early. a After participants were trained to press too early on the position
task, they started pressing earlier on the number task. b After participants
were trained to press too early on the number task, they started pressing
early on the position task. Green arrows show the direction of feedback
generalization. Error bars = +/− 1 SEM. *p < .05. ***p < .001. (Colour
figure online)
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a dynamic representation of target position. Of course, the
distinction is somewhat arbitrary. However, I suspect the first
formulation is superior.
When the stimulus is visible, the eyes can track high level
motion gestalts that are constructed by many parts of the
visual system (Barnes, 2008). Likewise, during occlusion,
the eyes can track occluded acceleration (Bennett, de Xivry,
Barnes, & Lefevre, 2007) occluded curvilinear trajectories
(Mrotek & Soechting, 2007) the occluded edge of a rolling
wheel (De Freitas, Myers, & Nobre, 2016). Tracking is influ-
enced the predictable effects of gravity and characteristic ob-
ject motions learned on previous trials (Bosco, Delle
Monache, & Lacquaniti, 2012). It seems that the eyes are
guided by naturalistic, time-varying representation of occlud-
edmoving objects (Bosco et al., 2015). Are the brain networks
that construct these smart motion gestalts and time-varying
representations part of the oculomotor system or not? This is
probably stretching the definition of ‘oculomotor system’ to a
point where the term loses meaning.
Finally, the oculomotor account cannot explain feature PM
(see Fig. 2b–d). For example, the oculomotor system would
simply fail to lock on to colour change or number change. If the
CRCmodel were conclusively established by new research, we
would be forced to conclude that PM is mediated by a mech-
anism which is not at all dedicated to oculomotor control.
Summary of mental imagery and the oculomotor
system
I conclude that PM is not mediated by mental imagery (as
claimed by Huber & Krist, 2004) or by the oculomotor system
(as claimed by Makin & Poliakoff, 2011). Mental imagery
may happen during PM, but the mere existence of mental
imagery cannot explain performance. Meanwhile, even posi-
tion PM may fundamentally depend on mechanisms outside
the oculomotor network. The oculomotor system cannot func-
tion in feature space, and the putative common rate control-
ler is certainly outside the oculomotor network.
The common rate controller in interruption
paradigms
One crucial methodological distinction in the PM literature
is between production tasks (see Fig. 1a), and interruption
paradigms (Fig. 1b). In interruption paradigms, the target
disappears and then reappears farther along its trajectory.
Reappearance might be at the correct time, too early, or too
late. Participants discriminate reappearance error (early or
late). Crucially, there is no visible occluder in most inter-
ruption paradigms, so the exact position and time of reap-
pearance cannot be anticipated. Again, participants could
update a representation of target position at the right speed.
If the target reappeared in a surprisingly advanced position,
the participant would report early reappearance, but if it
reappeared in a surprisingly retarded position, they would
report late reappearance.
We can also run interruption paradigms in feature space.
For instance, in a number interruption paradigm, the digits
count down toward zero, disappear, reappear, and then con-
tinue counting down. During occlusion, the participant could
mentally count at a constant rate. If the number on reappear-
ance were surprisingly advanced, the participant would report
early reappearance, if it were surprisingly retarded, they would
report late reappearance.
Experiment 2 compared performance on position and num-
ber interruption paradigms. The trial structure is shown in Fig.
5. The dynamic processes reappeared after occlusion, with
one of five levels of reappearance error (very early, early, on
time, late, very late). Participants judged whether reappear-
ance was too early or too late (so they were forced to give
an incorrect response on the on-time trials). The proportion of
‘early’ reports was computed for each level of reappearance
error. Supplementary Materials 4 describes the method and
results.
The CRC model predicts that performance should be sim-
ilar in these position and number tasks. Although there was a
main effect of task, and some unexpected interactions involv-
ing speed and task, this prediction was largely confirmed (see
Fig. 6a). In both tasks, participants could discriminate reap-
pearance error successfully. Participants were also biased by
speed in comparable ways (see Fig. 6b–c). Finally, sensitivity
to reappearance error—the metric most closely related to the
rate control function—was very similar in both tasks.
Experiment 2 thus provides more evidence for CRC using the
interruption paradigm rather than the production task protocol.
Alternative strategies in PM
So far, I have presented the positive case for the CRC account.
For balance, the next two sections provide necessary cautions
and caveats. These are very important for evaluating PM re-
search more generally. The first problem is that PM partici-
pants can adopt multiple strategies which recruit different cog-
nitive mechanisms.
One alternative during production tasks is called the
‘clocking strategy’ (DeLucia & Liddell, 1998). The clocking
strategy is to obtain a time-to-contact (TTC) estimate just be-
fore occlusion (perhaps based on an optic invariant called
‘tau’; Gibson, 1979; Lee, 1976), then count this down before
initiating the motor response (Tresilian, 1995). As described
in Supplementary Materials 1 Section 5, some contemporary
PM researchers believe the clocking strategy is used by de-
fault (Baurès et al., 2010, 2011; Bennett et al., 2010).
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To illustrate the clocking strategy, consider a production
task with a single moving target (as in Fig. 1a). TTC can be
estimated at the exact point when the target reaches the
occluder. The resulting TTC representation is an estimate of
how long it would take for the target to reach the other side,
assuming it continued at the same velocity. This TTC repre-
sentation could be fed to an internal clock, which delays the
motor response appropriately. If people use clocking, the oc-
cluded target position is not represented or updated, and there
is no need track the target with eye movements or spatial
attention. In fact, the brain could simply forget about the ex-
istence of the occluded target altogether and just run the inter-
nal clock before executing the motor response.
Participants can also use the clocking strategy in feature
PM tasks. The TTC estimate could be obtained in a variety
of heterogeneous ways for different kinds of feature motion,
and again fed forward to the internal clock (see Fig. 7b).
Again, the occluded process could be simply forgotten while
the clock counts down preestimated TTC (in fact, the
properties of common clock plausibly explain the VE slope
similarities).
The number task requires special consideration here, be-
cause confusingly it looks like it must involve clocking.
However, there is a fundamental difference between (1) men-
tally counting the down the numbers at the speed they were
changing before occlusion and (2) using the clocking strategy,
where there is no such rate-controlled simulation during oc-
clusion. To reiterate, the key distinction is whether participants
run a dynamic simulation of the occluded process (see Fig.
7a), or whether they forget about the occluded process and
merely withhold a motor response for a duration equal to
preestimated TTC (Fig. 7b).
It is important to recognize that clocking and rate controlled
simulation are simply two available strategies. Participants
could switch between the strategies arbitrarily, for example,
if the cognitive load associated with one strategy feels too
burdensome. It is difficult to determine whether participants
use clocking or not during production tasks.
Posi!on Numbers
First visible period (mo!on at 10, 20 or 40%/s, first 20 to 40% of process)
Occlusion (hidden mo!on 50, 25 or 0% faster or slower than in visible periods, giving 5 
levels of reappearance error). The target is invisible in the Posi!on task, the counter 
invisible in the Number task.
Second visible period (mo!on at 10, 20 or 40%/s, last 20-40% of process)
Unspeeded judgment (did the target reappear early or late?)
8.20
2.40
Fig. 5 Experiment 2 method
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DeLucia and Liddell (1998) suggest that interruption para-
digms preclude clocking. At occlusion onset, the participant
does not knowwhen or where the target will reappear (there is
no marked endpoint and no visible occluder). This means that
participants cannot form a TTC estimate at occlusion onset.
Note that if the occluder were visible, clocking would be via-
ble in interruption paradigms.
Although DeLucia and Liddell’s (1998) claim is plausible,
interruption paradigms with invisible occluders can also be
tackled with several ‘unwanted’ strategies. For instance, par-
ticipants could simultaneously obtain TTC estimates for mul-
tiple locations spread along the future path of the target. At
reappearance, an estimate of occlusion duration could be com-
pared with the TTC estimate associatedwith that reappearance
location.
However, the evidence that participants cognitively en-
gage with the occluded target is much stronger for inter-
ruption paradigms than for production tasks. If pursuit eye
movements are permitted, participants often track the tar-
gets spontaneously (Bennett & Barnes, 2006; Makin &
Poliakoff, 2011), and eye position at reappearance reliably
predicts behavioural judgments (Jonikaitis et al., 2009;
Wexler & Klam, 2001). This suggests that participants
attempt to simulate ongoing motion during interruption
paradigms, and the eyes are guided by the simulation.
Nevertheless, alternative strategies cannot be ruled out in
interruption paradigms completely. Unfortunately, there is
no pure PM task that can only be cracked with a single
strategy.
Furthermore, DeLucia (2013) plausibly notes that PM
participants might sometimes employ rough heuristics.
These could even be quite explicit. In production tasks, par-
ticipants might ‘press promptly if the occluder looks small,
but wait a long time if the occluder looks large’ or ‘press
early if the target is going fast, but wait a long time if it is
moving slowly’. In interruption paradigms, participants
might compare occlusion duration to the average of all pre-
vious trials. Whether such heuristics produce good perfor-
mance or not depends on how well spatial and temporal
confounds are controlled (as described in Supplementary
Materials 2 and 4).
These cautions are sobering for PM researchers. The best
we can do is replicate theoretically interesting effects with
different response protocols. Previous work found a theoreti-
cally interesting similarity between position and number tasks
using the production task protocol (where clocking is viable).
Experiment 2 replicated this similarity with an interruption
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Fig. 6 a Proportion of ‘early’ judgements as a function of reappearance
error in the position and number trials. bData from the position task, with
slow, medium, and fast trials included. cData from the number task, with
slow, medium, and fast trials included. Error bars = +/− 1 SEM
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Fig. 7 Cartoon depictions of (a) the common rate control (CRC) and (b) the clocking strategy. (Colour figure online)
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paradigm (where clocking is not viable without modification,
and is less likely). We can thus tentatively conclude that the
position-number similarity arises from a common rate control-
ler (see Fig. 7a) rather than a common clocking stage (Fig. 7b).
Alternative explanations for PM effects
We can now move on to another issue with PM research.
Many observed effects can be explained by changes to sub-
jective velocity before occlusion (Bennett et al., 2010). For
example, if the target looks slow, participants will press later;
if it looks fast, they will press earlier. Any factor which influ-
ences perceived velocity during the visible period must influ-
ence CTEs (whatever strategy participants are using). For ex-
ample, moving objects often appear faster if fixation is re-
quired, and this could be why CTEs are often shorter during
fixation (Makin & Poliakoff, 2011).
Several PM experiments have documented dual-task inter-
ference costs (Baurès, Bennett, & Causer, 2015; Baurès,
DeLucia, Olson, & Oberfeld, 2017; Baurès et al., 2010,
2011; DeLucia & Novak, 1997; Lyon & Waag, 1995;
Oberfeld & Hecht, 2008). These experiments illustrate the
difference between pre and post occlusion explanations. For
example, Baurès et al. (2010) presented two PM tasks concur-
rently (with one horizontal path slightly above the other).
Participants made one CTE of the first-arriving target and then
a second CTE for the second-arriving target. CTEs for the
first-arriving target were equivalent to CTEs measured in a
one-object baseline condition. However, CTEs for the
second-arriving target were delayed compared to the one-
object baseline condition. The dual-task interference was thus
asymmetrical, with all costs falling on the second CTE. In a
follow up study, Baurès et al. (2011) observed the same asym-
metrical interference effect when a cue at occlusion onset in-
dicated that one of the two targets could be ignored. Therefore,
the interference must have happened in the visible period,
before occlusion.
The SRC model suggests two PM tasks could run in par-
allel, without interference. Perhaps the dual-task interference
found by Baurès et al. (2010) supports the CRC model?
However, the dual-task interference might arise from a visual
bottleneck that limits motion processing before occlusion
(Baurès et al., 2011), so it does not provide definitive evidence
for the CRCmodel (although interference between concurrent
visual and auditory PM tasks might be instructive in future
work).
In summary, any manipulation which distorts subjective
velocity before occlusion (such as fixation commands or sec-
ondary tasks) is likely to shift PM performance accordingly.
This is true whether people use the clocking strategy or run
rate-controlled simulations.
So, what is the ‘common rate controller’ anyway?
Many researchers believe there is a ‘core timing system’ in the
brain (Coull, Cheng, &Meck, 2011).We can thus ask whether
the rate controller can be reduced to this core timing system.
Contemporary PM papers rarely make these links, so it is
worth working through these speculative possibilities in
detail.
What is the core timing system?
The classic pacemaker-accumulator clock model provides a
framework for understanding time perception and timed be-
haviour in humans and animals (Coull et al., 2011; Wearden,
2013). A simplified diagram of the pacemaker-accumulator
clock model is shown in Fig. 8a. The pacemaker emits ticks
at regular intervals, when the switch closes, and the ticks pass
into the accumulator. The final value in the accumulator is
committed to memory and represents subjective duration of
the stimulus.
Some researchers claim this internal clock is part of a core
timing system, centred on the basal ganglia (BG), particularly
the dorsal striatum, and pre-supplementary motor areas (pre-
SMA). These brain regions have been repeatedly identified in
fMRI studies of interval timing (Coull, Vidal, Nazarian, &
Macar, 2004; Lewis & Miall, 2003). Indeed, after reviewing
fMRI work, Coull et al. (2011) concluded that ‘results are
suggestive of a centralized, context independent, supramodal
timer localized in the dorsal striatum of the BG’ (p. 7). The
vital role of the BG in timing has also been demonstrated by
lesion and pharmacological studies in animals.
Is the common rate controller the same thing
as the core timing system?
I tentatively propose that this ‘centralized, supramodal timer’
incorporating the BG could mediate the rate control function
(see Fig. 8c). The pacemaker could be temporarily coupled to
representations of the occluded process in PM tasks, while it
could be coupled to an accumulator in other interval timing
tasks. Prior to occlusion, the temporary network could become
sensitive to how much change happens per tick of the pace-
maker. Then, during occlusion, the pacemaker could continue
ticking and drive mental updating at approximately the same
rate. Local predictive mechanisms within each sensory map
could still be present, but these may cover very short
occlusions only. This model was also outlined in Makin
(2017) and is clearly distinct from how the internal clock
would be deployed if people use the clocking strategy (see
Fig. 8b).
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Some researchers disagree with the core timing system
hypothesis and believe that temporal information is dis-
tributed throughout the cortex (e.g. Johnston, Arnold, &
Nishida, 2006). However, evidence for a single
supramodal clock and distributed timing can be
reconciled. Coull et al. (2011) suggest that distributed
timing covers the subsecond range, while there could
still be a supramodal clock which is recruited for longer
intervals (Coull et al., 2011; Lewis & Miall, 2003). This
fits well with the claim that the CRC is only recruited
during longer occlusions.
Neuroimaging evidence that the common rate
controller is related to the core timing system
Using fMRI, Lencer et al. (2004) compared brain activations
from visible and occluded tracking conditions. Participants
attempted to follow all targets with eye movements.
The DLPFC was selectively activated in the occlusion
condition. Makin and Chauhan (2014) thus proposed that
the DLPFC mediates rate control. However, Lencer et al.
(2004) found several other activations during occlusion, in-
cluding subregions of the cerebellum, the supplementary and
pre-supplementary eye fields, and intriguingly, the basal gan-
glia and premotor cortex (that is, the centre of the core timing
system). As Lencer et al. (2004) pointed out, increased sac-
cade frequency could explain some of the occlusion-related
activations. However converging evidence comes from
O‘Driscoll et al. (2000), who found that the caudate nucleus
of the BGwas activated during predictive pursuit of sinusoidal
target motion.
These studies support the notion that the BG circuitry func-
tions like a central rate controller, which can be used to control
simulations of target motion. The same rate controller could
control simulations ofmotion in feature space.Meanwhile, the
DLPFC could have an executive role, or inhibit irrelevant and
disruptive visual inputs during occlusion. In Fig. 8c, the
DLPFC is envisaged as providing a command signal, facili-
tating coupling between the rate controller and cortical senso-
ry maps, or between the rate controller and the accumulator.
There is also some fMRI evidence that the cerebellum me-
diates PM (O’Reilly et al., 2008). However, brain lesion stud-
ies suggests the cerebellum is not essential for performance
but may fine-tune performance based on feedback (Deluca
et al., 2014; Roth et al., 2013). Therefore, the cerebellum is
probably not the neural home of the rate controller (see
Supplementary Materials 1 Sections 6–8).
Fig. 8 Relationships between CRC and the internal clock model. a Basic
schematic of the pacemaker-accumulator clock model. b How this inter-
nal clock could be recruited if participants used a clocking strategy in PM
tasks. c Speculative version of the common rate control model. The
pacemaker/rate controller component could be functionally coupled to
sensory maps and guide updating during occlusion. The accumulator
could be just one target module of the pacemaker/rate controller. The
pacemaker/rate controller could be implemented by basal ganglia circuit-
ry. The DLPFC could have an executive role, switching connections
between the rate controller and other modules. Local extrapolation prob-
ably occurs within the sensory maps (curved arrows) but the rate control-
ler could be recruited during long occlusions. (Colour figure online)
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Dissociation between short and long occlusions
It is worth reemphasising that PM researchers should not ex-
pect the same brain mechanisms to mediate PM tasks with
shorter and longer occlusions (although the frontier line divid-
ing ‘short’ from ‘long’ is fuzzy). Various predictive mecha-
nisms seem to cover 100–200 ms of occlusion automatically
(Benguigui et al., 2004; Bennett & Barnes, 2006; Tresilian,
1995). These mechanisms overcome visuomotor delay during
smooth pursuit and may explain flash lag effect (Nijhawan,
1994) and representational momentum (Gray & Thornton,
2001). The CRC may be solely responsible for updating after
these local predictive mechanisms fade. This may happen at
slightly different times in different PM tasks. When designing
experiments to probe CRC function, occlusions of around 1
second or longer are advisable.
Future PM experiments
Given existing neuroscientific evidence, one could plausibly
associate the putative rate controller with one of many brain
regions, including the modules of the frontoparietal attentional
system, the DLPFC, core timing networks in the dorsal stria-
tum of the BG and pre-SMA, or perhaps the cerebellum.
These could all be regions of interest in future fMRI studies.
More interestingly, we could use fMRI to falsify the CRC
model: If position, number, colour, and accumulation PM
tasks produce totally different patterns of brain activity, with
no common node, the CRC model would have to be
reconsidered. However, I predict that this common node
would only be reliably activated when occlusion duration ex-
ceeds 1 second (and certainly more than 200 ms).
Conclusions
The prediction-motion literature is fragmented. However, we
can nevertheless distil four novel claims, which can serve as
the foundation for future research:
1. Local predictive circuits can cover short occlusions.
However, a common rate controller is recruited for longer
occlusions.
2. The common rate control model explains more PM data
than mental imagery or oculomotor accounts.
3. Unfortunately, there is no pure PM task that uniquely taps
a single cognitive mechanism. However, observed
intertask similarities probably arise from a common rate
controller.
4. The rate controller might be reduced to the core timing
system, incorporating the basal ganglia.
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